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COMMENTS
THE USE OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE INSANITY
DEFENSE: A NEW EXCEPTION TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures.1 To effectuate these rights, the Supreme Court
created the exclusionary rule,2 which mandates that any evidence ille-
gally obtained be excluded from trial. 3 Similarly, to ensure fifth amend-
ment rights against self-incrimination and of due process, 4 the Court
held in Miranda v. Arizona 5 that "the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interroga-
tion of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe-
guards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."'6
Frequent conflicts have arisen between an accused's fourth or fifth
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). The fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 The Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
3 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. In Weeks, the Supreme Court ordered that letters and docu-
ments seized during a warrantless search of the defendant's house be excluded from evidence
and restored to the defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
4 The fifth amendment provides: "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897) (prohibited use of involuntary confessions against defendants as violative of fifth
amendment).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Id. at 444. The Court further held that the right to have counsel present at the interro-
gation is indispensable to the protection of the fifth amendment privilege; therefore, "[nlo
effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifi-
cally made after the warnings" set forth by the Court have been given. Id. at 470.
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amendment rights, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the interests of
law enforcement personnel in securing criminal convictions.7 More
often than not, evidence excluded for either fourth or fifth amendment
purposes establishes "beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt" that the
defendant is guilty.8 In the past, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
also permitted defendants to commit perjury and go unpunished be-
cause the prosecution could not use the illegal evidence to challenge
their credibility. 9
This conflict has led the Supreme Court to create several exceptions
to the exclusionary rule in order to restrict application of the rule to
those situations "where its remedial objectives are thought most effica-
ciously served."10 Thus, the prosecution can use illegally obtained evi-
dence to impeach a defendant.1" The Court has also prohibited
application of the rule in searches following arrests under presumptively
valid statutes later held unconstitutional, 12 in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings,13 in federal civil tax cases, 14 in grand jury hearings,15 or to bar
testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of an
illegal search. 16 Finally, the Court has narrowed the class of persons
eligible to challenge the legality of a search. 1 7 These recent modifica-
tions of the exclusionary rule have led some commentators to conclude
that the Court is ready to abandon or modify the rule.'8
Recently, federal prosecutors proposed a new exception to the ex-
clusionary rule in United States v. Hinckley. 19 In Hinckley the government
moved to admit illegally obtained evidence solely to rebut Hinckley's
insanity defense. While both district and appellate courts denied the
7 See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
8 Kaufman v. United States, 347 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Wright, Must the Criminal G Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736 (1972).
9 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). Since the Court's adoption of the
impeachment exception in Walder, this problem has been eliminated. For further discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 64-78.
10 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
11 The impeachment exception, created in Walder, 347 U.S. at 65, is the oldest exception
to the exclusionary rule.
12 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
13 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
14 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
15 Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.
16 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (defendants in criminal prosecu-
tion charged with crimes of possession do not have "automatic standing" to challenge legality
of search); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (only defendants whose fourth amendment
rights were violated may benefit from exclusionary rule's protections).
18 See 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§1.2 at 21 (1978); The Supreme Court 1979-80 Term-Exclusionag Rule, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
4137 (July 23, 1980).
19 515 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), a.fd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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motion, 20 within two months of the appellate court's decision an Illinois
appellate court reached the opposite conclusion in People v. Finkey. 21
Both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Illinois appellate
courts based their decisions on the deterrence rationale underlying the
exclusionary rule. The Hincl/ court reasoned that deterrence flowing
from the rule would suffer if it permitted the government to use illegally
obtained evidence to rebut the defendant's insanity defense. 22 The
Fzke court, however, noted that the same degree of deterrence existing
under the impeachment exception would remain if the state used the
illegal evidence in rebuttal.23 Furthermore, where the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia saw no reason to single out the insanity
defense for special treatment under the exclusionary rule, 24 the F'nkey
court gave special weight to the difficulty of rebutting the insanity
defense.25
These two courts reached opposite conclusions because of their dif-
ferent philosophies concerning application of the exclusionary rule to
exclude illegal evidence relevant to an individual's insanity defense. De-
bate over use of illegally obtained evidence arises from the conflict be-
tween the need to protect an accused's fourth and fifth amendment
rights and the equally strong interest of society in securing criminal con-
victions.26 Much of the debate turns on whether exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence furthers deterrence of police misconduct or merely
impedes the truth-finding process.2 7
The need to present all relevant information to the trier of fact in-
creases when a defendant asserts an insanity defense. 28 A determination
20 515 F. Supp. at 1358, 672 F.2d at 134.
21 105 11. App. 3d 230, 434 N.E.2d 18 (1982). In both Hinck/1 and Finke, the illegally
obtained evidence that prosecutors sought to admit concerned statements made by the de-
fendants to law enforcement officers. In HinckLky the government also moved to introduce
papers seized from the defendant's cell at the Federal Correctional Institution at Butner. The
court's opinion, however, dealt only with the Miranda-violative statements in relation to the
rebuttal of the insanity defense. Hincklg, 672 F.2d at 132-34. Therefore this Comment will
only address the Miranda issue.
22 Hinckly, 672 F.2d at 133.
23 Finkq, 105 Il. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20. The court reasoned that to allow the
defendant to establish through representations to a psychiatrist a possibly fraudulent insanity
defense without affording the state an opportunity to challenge those statements would be the
same as allowing a defendant "to directly perjure himself and then hide behind the fifth
amendment. .. ." Id.
24 Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 134.
25 Knkq, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20.
26 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75; see also Powell, 428 U.S. at 488-89; Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348.
27 See, e.g. ,Powell, 428 U.S. at 489-92. For further discussion of this debate, see infra notes
51-78 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(en banc). Both
the exclusionary rule and the insanity defense have been the objects of much debate in recent
19831
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of whether illegal evidence may be used to rebut insanity turns upon the
definition of insanity applied by the courts and the allocation of the
years. Groups at the state and federal levels have urged the abolition of both, thus far with
only limited success. In 1982 California eliminated the exclusionary rule with the adoption of
Proposition 8, which reformed California's criminal code. Since the Hinckley trial and its
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, numerous states as well as Congress have been re-
evaluating the insanity defense. Some urge the adoption of a new verdict form, "guilty but
mentally ill." Seven states have now adopted this law: ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.030,
12.47.050 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 408 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503
(1983); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-3(c), 1005-2-6 (1981); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1976).
Others advocate abolishing the defense entirely. See Richardson, Should We Allow the Hinckley
Backlash to Cause Bad Law? The Insanity Defense, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2180 (1982); 13 Crim. Just.
Newsletter, Apr. 26, 1982, at 1-2 (insanity defense under attack); Nat'l L. J., May 3, 1982, at 1
(is insanity defense breaking down?); 109 N.J.L.J., May 27, 1982, at 8, col. 2 (Idaho abolishes
the insanity defense); 95 L.A. Daily J., June 23, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Hinckley prompts call for
reform); 95 L.A. Daily J., July 7, 1982, at 4, col. 3 (pro "guilty but insane" verdict); 95 L.A.
Daily J., August 11, 1982, at 4, col. 1 (against "guilty but mentally ill"); 110 N.J.L.J., August
12, 1982, at 7, col. 2 (Hinckly aftermath).
Numerous commentators have advocated abolishing the insanity defense and removing
from the criminal trial the choice between medical and penal treatment of a convicted de-
fendant. See United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1968) (penologists, rather
than trial court, should determine criminal responsibility of defendant who raises insanity
defense); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 378 (S.
Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed. 1971); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?,
72 YALE LJ. 853, 869-71 (1963)(new laws rather than the insanity defense are necessary to
deal with insane individuals who have committed crimes); Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Opera-
tion: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 106-08 (com-
mitment for psychiatric treatment should be considered at sentencing, not at adjudication of
guilt). But see Brawner, 471 F.2d at 985-86 (reassessment of viability of insanity defense is for
the legislative branch, not the judiciary). Other commentators believe that the defense com-
prises so integral a part of the common law that abolition might violate the accused's consti-
tutional right of due process. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra, 378-79; A. GOLDSTEIN,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 222-23 (1967); Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most
Signifcant Feature of the Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434,
436 (1973)(insanity defense has traditional place in our legal system).
Several Supreme Court justices have proposed changes in the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring) and Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 611-13 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (advocating adoption of good faith
exception to exclusionary rule); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 420-23 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (exclusion is an "anomalous and ineffective
mechanism" and Congress should evaluate the rule and adopt a more effective alternative);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (search and
seizure law in general should be completely overhauled); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 468 (1928) (exclude evidence only where admission would violate constitutional rights).
Commentators have also advocated reform; for a sampling, see Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964)(exclusion has not successfully deterred illegal law
enforcement; proposes civil commission to review unconstitutional acts); Burns, Mapp v.
Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969) (exclusionary rule and fourth
amendment enforcement generally should be placed in hands of states); Oaks, Studying the
Exclsionagy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-57 (1970) (rule is ineffective
deterrent of illegal searches); see also Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the ExclsionaV Rule,
25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971) and Wright, supra note 8 (narrow application of rule by invoking only
when violation is substantial).
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burden of proof for this defense.29 The Supreme Court has limited the
exclusionary rule so that illegal evidence must automatically be ex-
cluded only from the prosecution's direct case, ie., where the prosecu-
tion must establish the guilt of the accused. 30 Specifically, the
constitutionality of admitting illegal evidence to rebut the insanity de-
fense depends upon whether proof of sanity is an element of a crime that
the prosecution must prove as part of its case in chief.3' Judges and
commentators disagree as to whether insanity and mens rea can coex-
ist.32 Some urge that insanity completely negates mens rea, and there-
fore proof of insanity is an essential element of the crime.33 Others
maintain that mens rea exists separately from insanity, thus proof of
sanity is completely separate from proof of the crime charged.34
This Comment analyzes whether the practical effects of using ille-
gal evidence to rebut the insanity defense are consistent with current
exclusionary jurisprudence, and concludes that the insanity-rebuttal ex-
ception is proper under certain circumstances. This Comment argues
that this exception to the exclusionary rule conforms to the traditional
exclusionary rationale for the impeachment exception. Moreover, the
insanity-rebuttal exception is well-suited to the context of the insanity
defense because it ensures that the trier-of-fact will receive all relevant
information on the issue of the defendant's sanity.
II. THE DETERRENCE RATIONALE AS A BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. THE DETERRENCE RATIONALE
From the inception of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States,35 courts and commentators alike have debated the theoretical ra-
tionale underlying the rule.36 The judiciary and commentators have ad-
29 The various definitions of the rules for the burden of proof with regard to insanity are
set forth in/a at notes 91-161 and accompanying text.
30 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). For further discussion, see infa notes 64-
78 and accompanying text.
31 See in/fa text accompanying notes 122-43.
32 See in/ra text accompanying notes 144-61.
33 See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1895).
34 Note, Mens Rra and Insanip,, 28 ME. L. REv. 500, 511 (1976). For further discussion of
the relationship between insanity and mens rea, see in/a notes 144-161 and accompanying
text.
35 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36 Justice Blackmun explicitly noted that "the evolution of the exclusionary rule has been
marked by sharp divisions in the Court." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 n.15
(1976). For a sample of commentators' debates over the theories and efficacy of the exclusion-
ary rule, compare J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 78-79
(1966) (Weeks created personal right to exclusion of illegally seized evidence) with Burger,
supra note 28, at 5, and McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exc/usionag Rule and the Right ofPrivacy, 15
1983]
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vanced three theories in the cases: the personal right or privacy
theory,37 the judicial integrity theory,3 8 and the deterrence theory. 39 Of
ARIZ. L. REV. 327, 329, 336 (1973) (Weeks decision represents Court's refusal to acquiesce in
violations of fourth amendment). Compare Kamisar, Is the Exclusionay Rule an "Illogical" or
"Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 78 (1978) (must enforce
exclusionary rule because to do otherwise would be to sanction illegality) with Wilkey, The
Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 222, 227 (1978) (applica-
tion of exclusionary rule leads to total distortion of truth and it should be discarded).
37 Under the personal right or privacy theory, the victim of an illegal search and seizure is
entitled to judicial exclusion of any illegally seized evidence as a matter of personal right. See
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 36, at 78-79. The Weeks Court apparently followed this theory in
holding that the Constitution requires the police to return illegally obtained evidence to the
accused. 232 U.S. at 392, 397-98. In Weeks, a United States Marshall conducted a warrantless
search of the defendant's home and seized personal letters which implicated Weeks in a num-
bers racket. Id. at 387-88. The defendant asserted that this search violated his constitutional
rights, demanding that the letters be returned to him. Id. at 389. The Court initially stated
that all persons, innocent or guilty, are entitled to resort to the courts to vindicate their fourth
amendment rights. Id. at 392. The Court concluded that use of evidence obtained illegally
against an accused would emasculate the guarantees of the fourth amendment. Id. While the
Court excluded the letters from evidence and ordered their restoration to Weeks, it did not
specifically state that he was personally entitled to them. Id. at 392-94.
The Weeks personal right theory has eroded to the point that an accused has no absolute
right to retrieve illegally seized evidence, see Welsh v. United States, 220 F.2d 200, 202 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), to seek redress in the courts, see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), or
have illegally obtained evidence excluded, id.; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974) (purpose of exclusionary rule is not to redress injury to the privacy of search
victim because" 'the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored' ")
(quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)). Moreover, the Court has stated
outright that exclusion is not a constitutional right in and of itself, but merely a device cre-
ated to effectuate fourth amendment guarantees. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486
(1976). Justice Rehnquist applied this rationale to exclude evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-49 (1974).
38 The premise of the judicial integrity rationale is that the judiciary should not acquiesce
in violations of the fourth amendment. The Weeks Court suggested this rationale when it
warned that obtaining criminal convictions by unlawful means "should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitu-
tion. ... 232 U.S. at 392; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). By
excluding illegally obtained evidence, a court avoids legitimizing unconstitutional police con-
duct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitu-
tion as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1562 (1972).
The Court's use of the judicial integrity rationale has declined since its decision in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), when it extended the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions
under the fourteenth amendment, overruling its earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949). See Kamisar, supra note 36. This decline has coincided with Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting application of the exclusionary sanction. These decisions allow judicial acquies-
cence in police misconduct under certain circumstances, and are thus antithetical to the
judicial integrity rationale. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 36, at 76-77. Justice White, dissenting
in Powell, pointed out the fallacies underlying the judicial integrity argument. Justice White
argued that judges are not rendered participants in fourth amendment violations if they do
not exclude illegally obtained evidence because "[e]xclusion of the evidence does not cure the
invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." 428 U.S. at 540. Further-
more, when reliable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact, the entire truthfind-
ing process is substantially impaired. Id. This in turn leads to a weakening of the public's
conception ofjudicial integrity. Kaplan, The Limits ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV.
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these rationales, deterrence has emerged as the primary justification for
the exclusionary rule.40
The basic premise of the deterrence theory is that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence will "compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it. ' '41 Law enforcement personnel will respect fourth amend-
ment rights because they learn that illegal searches and seizures will not
produce admissible evidence.4 2 Thus, the goal of the exclusionary rule is
"to prevent, not to repair," or to protect the general public from future
police misconduct rather than to redress the accused's constitutional
rights or to ensure judicial integrity.4 3
In UnitedStates v. Calandra,4 4 the Court went so far as to characterize
deterrence as the sole purpose of the rule.45 Although the Court has
consistently recognized that all courts must be concerned with preserv-
ing the integrity of the judicial process,4 6 it has explicitly stated that
"this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of
highly probative evidence. 47 Furthermore, where the deterrent effect is
insubstantial or "incremental," there is no reason for exclusion of the
illegally obtained evidence. 48 Deterrence is the narrowest of the three
rationales advanced for the exclusionary sanction. 4 9
B. CRITICISM OF THE DETERRENCE THEORY
Even in its present limited form, the exclusionary rule has gener-
ated extensive criticism. Much of this commentary has centered on the
1027, 1036 n.53 (1974). For further discussion of how exclusion impairs the truthfinding pro-
cess, see infra text accompanying notes 64-78. Despite Justice White's valid arguments, the
Court continues to recognize that "judicial integrity" is a relevant, although subordinate,
factor in exclusionary jurisprudence. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35
(1976).
39 See, e.g., Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31-32.
40 See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660; Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217; Wolf,
338 U.S. at 31. In Calandra the Court characterized deterrence as the rule's sole rationale.
414 U.S. at 348.
41 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. See generall.y United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
42 See Oaks, supra note 28, at 668.
43 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217; see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
44 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
45 Id. at 348.
46 Powell, 428 U.S. at 485.
47 Id.
48 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-51; see also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24
(1969) (Court "decline[s] to extend the court-made exclusionary rule to cases in which its
deterrent purpose would not be served'); Wader, 347 U.S. at 65 (refused to extend the exclu-
sionary rule to situations which would result in a perversion of the fourth amendment).
49 Note, Confision Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of The Fourth Amendment, 23 ARIz. L.
REV. 801, 806 (1981).
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perceived inefficacy of the deterrence rationale.50 Criticism from the
Supreme Court, however, has centered primarily on the havoc the rule
wreaks on the trial process.51 In Stone v. Powell,52 the Court noted that
application of the exclusionary sanction diverts the focus of the trial
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, applica-
tion of the rule perverts the truth-finding process because the evidence
excluded is "typically reliable and often the most probative information
50 Powell, 428 U.S. at 492 & n.32; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 & n.22
(1976), for a review of the problems with various empirical studies of the exclusionary rule.
These studies have been inconclusive as to whether deterrence does result from exclusion of
illegally seized evidence. See S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 50-56 (1977); OAKS, supra note 28, at 678-89, 700-09; Spi-
otto, Search and Seizure, An Empirical Study of the Exc/usionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 243, 275-78 (1973). See generally Canon, Is the Exclusiona y Rule in Failing Health? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 725-26 (1974); COMMENT,
On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exc/usionay Rule. A Critique of the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974). Chief Justice Burger fails to see
how the police are deterred by a judicial ruling on suppression which never affects them
personally, and of which they learn (if at all) long after having "forgotten the details of the
particular episode which occasioned suppression." Burger, supra note 28, at 11. This fact was
recognized by the Court injanis, 428 U.S. at 458, where it stated that the imposition of the
exclusionary rule in a civil tax proceeding would have an insignificant deterrent effect since
"[i]t falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest." The Court also took notice
of the suggestion of some commentators that the police often view "trial and conviction as a
lesser aspect of law enforcement." Id. at 448 n.20.
51 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (only conse-
quence of rule as presently administered is unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept
from trier of fact, substantially impairing truthfinding function or even totally aborting the
trial); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("the history of the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile
and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective [of giving meaning to consti-
tutional guarantees against unlawful conduct by government officials]"); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (exclusion does not punish the official for his or her misconduct but
it is likely to result in release of a guilty defendant); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered"); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255. A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
389 (1964) ("[rule's] deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns,
and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance"); Burger, supra note 28,
at 12 (suggesting that a vast number of people are losing respect for law and the administra-
tion ofjustice because they think that the supression doctrine is defeating justice); Oaks, supra
note 28, at 739-49 (rule encourages police to give false testimony, fosters delay and diverts
focus of trial from guilt or innocence of the accused); Paulsen, The Exc/usionaiy Rule and M'iscon-
duct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci., 255, 256 (1961) (the "startling
result achieved under the rule: to deter the police both the guilty defendant and the law-
breaking officer go unpunished.").
52 428 U.S. at 489-90. The Court held that a state prisoner cannot seek federal habeas
corpus relief simply because illegally obtained evidence was introduced at the prisoner's trial,
reasoning that any advancement of fourth amendment rights is minimal in light of the sub-
stantial societal costs of applying the rule. Id. at 495. The Court rejected the argument that
law enforcement officials would be deterred by a fear that federal habeas review might reveal
police misconduct that escaped detection in the courts below. Id. at 493.
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bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 53 Invocation of the
rule also may diminish the accuracy of evidence presented in court be-
cause it encourages the police to lie to avert suppression of evidence. 54
Moreover, the Court in Powell noted that the rule often creates an
imbalance in particular cases "between the error committed by the po-
lice and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the
rule [which] is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to
the concept ofjustice. ' 55 This perceived imbalance has led the Court to
conclude that indiscriminate use of the rule may ultimately generate
disrespect for the law and for the administration of justice.56
Thus, the Court has weighed the costs and benefits of the rule,57
and-most notably in cases proposing a new exception or seeking appli-
cation of an already existing one- has increasingly found that "the soci-
etal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact" far
outweighs the interest in deterring illegal police conduct.58 The Court
has reasoned that the rule sufficiently discourages police misconduct if
the prosecution is prevented from using illegal evidence to fulfill its con-
stitutional burden of establishing all elements of the crime charged.59
For example, the Court has refused to extend the rule to grand jury
proceedings. The Court has reasoned that the need to keep the grand
jury unimpeded by an evidentiary rule that would only delay and dis-
rupt the proceedings outweighs any incremental deterrence benefits. 60
Invocation of the rule would only deter a police investigation knowingly
53 Id ; see also Burger, supra note 28, at 1; Wilkey, supra note 36, at 222.
54Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 n.18.
55 Powell, 428 U.S. at 490 & n.29.
56 Id. at 491. See generally Kaplan, supra note 38. Chief Justice Burger noted that the
public see only the frustration ofjustice; they experience the impact of the exclusionary rule
without understanding the important reasons underlying it. Moreover, he stated that the
view of the police themselves is that "the whip of justice is diverted from the lawbreaker to
the law-enforcer." Burger, supra note 28, at 12.
57 See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-37 & 736 n.8 (1980); Powell, 428 U.S. at
485-86; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); see also Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 389.
58 Payner, 447 U.S. at 736 n.8. In Payner, the defendant was not the one whose fourth
amendment rights were violated, thus he lacked standing to invoke the rule. Id. at 735-37.
59 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). Under certain circumstances, the "spec-
ulative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged" by admission of
illegal evidence is outweighed by the need to present all relevant information to the trier of
fact. Id. It is well-settled that illegally obtained evidence is admissible in federal probation
revocation hearings. The courts have reasoned that exclusion of such evidence from the de-
termination of guilt achieves the maximum deterrent effect. Any additional deterrence that
might flow from also excluding the evidence at probation revocation hearings would be mini-
mal. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512
F.2d 160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
60 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349, 351-52.
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directed toward discovering evidence solely for a grand jury;6 1 the inad-
missibility of the evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution negates
this incentive.62 Finally, the Court stressed that grand juries do not
finally adjudicate guilt or innocence. 63
C. THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
Beginning with Wa/der v. United Stales,64 the Supreme Court has re-
stricted application of the exclusionary rule so as not to impair the accu-
racy of the truthfinding process, stressing that the ascertainment of truth
"is a fundamental goal of our legal system." '65 The WaIder Court created
the impeachment exception, allowing the prosecution to use physical
evidence, inadmissible to establish the guilt of the accused, for impeach-
ment purposes. 66 The Court reasoned that the principles underlying the
exclusionary rule do not justify allowing a defendant to commit perjury
"in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his
credibility. '67
The Court extended this exception in Harris v. New York.6 While
Walder had been impeached with physical evidence relating to testi-
mony in his direct examination, 69 Harris was impeached with Miranda-
violative statements that bore directly on the crimes charged.70 Never-
61 Id. at 351.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 349. Similarly, in the context of civil tax proceedings, the Court refused to extend
the rule because "the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenu-
ated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the
removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign." Janis, 428 U.S.
at 458. Because the use of the illegal evidence "falls outside the offending officer's zone of
primary interest," exclusion from a civil case would not deter the officer. Id.
The Court has also held that only the victim of the challenged practices may invoke the
exclusionary rule. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). The Court is unconvinced that
any additional deterrence to be gained from allowing third parties, whose fourth amendment
rights have not been violated, to assert violations of others' fourth amendment rights justifies
"further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and
having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."
Id at 137 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
64 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
65 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).
66 347 U.S. at 65. In Wa/der, the defendant testified before the jury that he had never sold
illegal narcotics. Id. at 63. The government thereafter sought to impeach his testimony with
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure. Id. at 64.
67 Id. at 65. The defendant is, however, entitled to the freedom to deny all elements of the
case against him or her without the government resorting to use of the illegal evidence in its
case in chief. Id.
68 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
69 Wa/der, 347 U.S. at 63-64.
70 Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. In the most recent Supreme Court case invoking the impeach-
ment exception, Havens, the Court made it clear that the testimony impeached in both Wa/der
and Harris was given by the defendant while testifying on direct examination. 446 U.S. at
[Vol. 74
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theless, the Court applied the Wa/der rationale, reasoning that the im-
peachment process provides a "valuable aid to the jury in assessing
petitioner's credibility." The Court noted that "sufficient deterrence
flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecu-
tion in its case in chief."7'
Nevertheless, lower courts 72 and dissenting justices have argued
that the existence of any possible use for illegal evidence will encourage
law enforcement officers to violate an individual's constitutional
rights. 73 The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Oregon v. Hass,74
where it further elaborated on the relationship between the deterrence
rationale of Miranda and the impeachment exception. In Hass the Court
stated that police are deterred from future illegal behavior by "the ne-
cessity to give [Miranda] warnings. ' 75 If the warnings subsequently
prove to be incomplete and therefore defective, this does not mean "that
they have not served as a deterrent to the officer who is not then aware
of their defect .... ,"76 The Supreme Court dismissed the argument
that even though officers may know Miranda has been violated they may
continue to question the suspect in the hopes of gaining something "pos-
sibly [by] uncovering impeachment material. '77 The Court noted that,
where there clearly is an abuse, the traditional standards for evaluating
627. In Havens, however, the Court refused to make a flat rule permitting only statements on
direct examination to be impeached. Id. The Court held that statements made in response to
proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are
subject to impeachment with illegally obtained evidence inadmissible on the government's
direct case. Id. at 627-28. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the importance of
arriving at the truth in criminal trials. Id. at 626.
71 Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. The Court stated: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226.
72 The Supreme Court also raised the argument in Hass only to reject it. 420 U.S. at 723.
73 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (police will have almost no incentive
to follow Miranda requirements); Harris, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority's
holding tells police they may freely interrogate an accused because any evidence may be used
"if the defendant has the temerity to testify in his own defense"); United States v. Hinkley,
672 F.2d 115, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (broad scope of evidence relevant to insanity defense will
enhance possibility that law enforcement officers will abuse Miranda).
74 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
75 Id. at 723.
76 Id. The situation in Hass is somewhat analogous to that in Hincklk. In Hass the sus-
pect was given full Miranda warnings and accepted them. He later stated that he would like
to telephone an attorney, but was told he could not do so until the officers and he reached the
station. The suspect then provided inculpatory information. 420 U.S. at 715-16. While
Hinckley was in the custody of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Colum-
bia, he was advised of his rights. He then asked the police to allow him to confer with counsel
prior to answering any questions. Later that day, the FBI assumed jurisdiction and took
custody of Hinckley, again advising him of his rights. Without repeating his request for coun-
sel, Hinckley informed the FBI agents that he would answer background questions. Hinckley,
672 F.2d at 120 & n.35.
77 Hass, 420 U.S. at 723.
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voluntariness and trustworthiness will come into play. 78
III. THE INSANITY DEFESNE
Society views the insanity defense, as it does the exclusionary rule,
as a windfall to the defendant.7 9 The public believes that defendants
escape punishment by means of the "insanity dodge," developed by
shrewd lawyers and amenable experts.8 0 Yet the insanity defense is
rooted in the idea that criminal punishment should be imposed only on
those individuals who are responsible for their acts,8 ' hence, the defense
has long been viewed as essential to the American criminal justice
system .82
The criminal sanction is grounded on the idea that human conduct
is based on free choice; in fact, the sanction functions as though human
beings have free choice.8 3 The mentally ill, however, have impaired vo-
litional capacities. This impairment is given legal recognition in the
form of the insanity defense, under which such persons cannot be
punished.8 4
Moreover, invocation of the insanity defense presupposes that the
78 Id.
79 See Note, Guilty but Mentally 11.- A Retreat From the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED.
237, 237-38 (1981); Nat'l L. J., May 3, 1982, at 1.
80 H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 8 (1954); see also Eule,
The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 648 (1978) (public
hostility derives from widespread belief that insane offenders are treated with greater leniency
and are "back on the streets" sooner than their sane counterparts). The public's sense of
insecurity about insane defendants has grown with the increasing skepticism about the abili-
ties of psychiatrists to determine when mentally ill criminals are well enough to return to
society. Note, supra note 79, at 237-38. While the public is apprehensive, defendants have
their own misgivings about raising the insanity defense. Defendants are usually reluctant to
plead insanity except when confronted by the death sentence or long imprisonment. A.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 24. Moreover, the insanity verdict leads to an indeterminate
commitment in a maximum security mental hospital, an unattractive alternative to a penal
institution in the eyes of most defendants. A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1970); see also A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 24. For further discussion,
see infa text accompanying notes 179-86.
81 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1 at 2 (1972). Punishment
in the criminal law is predicated upon several different theories: prevention, restraint, rehabil-
itation, deterrence, education and retribution. Id. § 36, at 271-72; see also Goldstein & Katz,
supra note 28, at 855-56.
82 Wallach & Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibliy, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 209, 238 (1971).
83 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Wallach &
Rubin, supra note 82, at 237 n. 113.
84 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 82, at 237 n. 113; see also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.
469, 484-85 (1895); Brawner, 471 F.2d at 985; Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
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defendant "has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense."' 5
The defense places in issue the existence of a particular mental state
necessary to the commission of the crime, although it is not limited to
that particular mental state.8 6 If successfully interposed,8 7 the insanity
defense leads to a special verdict, not guilty by reason of insanity,88 and
usually commitment of the defendant to a mental institution for an in-
definite time period.89 Thus, the purpose of the insanity defense is usu-
ally said to be that of separating from the criminal justice system those
who should only be subjected to medical-custodial disposition. 90
A. THE INSANITY TESTS
Federal and state courts have generally applied one of four tests to
85 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1978); see Goldstein & Katz, supra note 28, at
858.
86 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 82, at 237 n. 113. Goldstein and Katz argue that the real
function of the insanity defense is "to authorize the state to hold those 'who must be found
not to possess the guilty mind mens rea,' even though the criminal law demands that no person
be held criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element of the offense
charged." Goldstein and Katz, supra note 28, at 864 (footnote omitted). For further discus-
sion of the relationship between mens rea and insanity, see infra text accompanying notes 144-
61.
87 For further discussion of the burden of proof for insanity, see infra text accompanying
notes 122-43. The insanity defense is raised in only a very small percentage of criminal cases,
in part because many who might raise it never to go trial. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28,
at 171.
88 W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 81, § 36 at 268. Recently, another verdict, "guilty
but mentally ill," has been proposed by commentators and legislatures. See supra note 28. For
a discussion of this proposal and what effect it would have on the use of illegally obtained
evidence to rebut insanity, see infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
89 In some automatic commitment jurisdictions defendants are committed upon a deter-
mination of insanity without further inquiry into their mental state. Note, The Insanity De-
fense: The Needfor Articulate Goals at the Acquittal, Commitment, and Release Stages, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 733, 742 n.46 (1964). Finally, in other mandatory commitment jurisdictions, a defend-
ant will be committed only after further proceedings are held to determine if he or she is still
insane or dangerous. Id. A few states authorize commitment only if civil commitment stan-
dards have been met. Id. at 744 & n.56. In other jurisdictions commitment is discretionary.
Id. at 742 n.46.
The defendant is not released until he or she is cured. Although the theory of the in-
sanity defense is that the insane cannot be held responsible and thus should not be subjected
to imprisonment, W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 81, § 36 at 268, several commentators
have pointed out that being termed insane and committed to a mental institution stigmatizes
the defendant just as much as a sentence in a penal institution would. Moreover, institution-
alization of an accused has clear penal overtones, but mandatory commitment statutes have
survived constitutional attack. Note, supra, at 737 & n.22. One commentator has also argued
that the present insanity tests, see infta notes 91-121 and accompanying text, do not fulfill the
therapeutic and protective goals of mandatory commitment. Since none of the tests "[focus]
on either the defendant's amenability to treatment or his danger to the community. . . they
do not determine whether he should be set free or confined to an institution." Note, supra, at
742.
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). For another view, see
Goldstein and Katz, supra note 28.
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determine criminal responsibility when the accused's sanity is at issue.9 1
All of these tests share two criteria: evidence of a mental disease or de-
fect, and evidence of a causal relationship between the mental disease or
defect and the criminal act.92
The traditional and prevailing rule is the M'Naghten test.93 Under
this rule, the defendant cannot be convicted if at the time of committing
the act the accused was laboring under a disease of the mind or a defect
of reason such that she or he did not know the nature and quality of the
act or, if the accused did know it, she or he did not know that the act
was wrong. 94 Commonly described as the "right-wrong" test, the
M'Naghten rule prescribes a narrow definition for insanity.95 "Only the
defendant's lack of knowledge of the nature of the conduct or inability
to recognize those actions as legally or morally impermissible constitutes
criminal incapacity. ' 96 Moreover, this test requires total impairment;
temporary or partial mental incapacity is not a sufficient basis for a
finding of insanity. 97
Courts have criticized the MANaghlen test as based on outmoded
concepts of the nature of insanity.98 By focusing exclusively on cogni-
tive ability, the test fails to address behavioral and emotional incapaci-
ties.99 Furthermore, the rule restricts expert testimony.100 Since the rule
directs the inquiry to ethical and moralistic rather than scientific con-
91 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 28, at 379-85.
92 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 82, at 238.
93 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 81, § 36 at 268. Seventeen states currently apply
the MWaghlen test: Ariz., State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 585 P.2d 1213 (1978); Fla., Witt v.
State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Iowa, State v. Donelson, 302
N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1981); Kan., Re Application of Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 612 P.2d 1211 (1980);
La., State v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1979); Minn., State v. Larson, 281 N.W. 2d 481
(Minn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); Miss., King v. United States, 374 So. 2d 808 (Miss.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Neb., State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W. 2d
881, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); Nev., Ogden v. State, 96 Nev. 258, 607 P.2d 576 (1980);
N.J., State v. Trantino, 44 NJ. 358, 209 A.2d 117 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966);
N.C., State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E. 2d 663 (1978), vacated on other grounds , 441 U.S.
929, on remand, 297 N.C. 584, 256 S.E.2d 234, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 954 (1979); Okla., Eddings
v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. 1980), modifed, 455 U.S. 104 (1981); Pa., Commonwealth
v. Scarborough, 491 Pa. 300, 421 A.2d 147 (1980); S.C., State v. Goolsby, 275 So.C. 110, 268
S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980); S.D., State v. Restau, 290 N.W. 2d 487 (S.D.
1980); Wash., State v. Tyler, 77 Wash. 2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), vacated on other grounds,
408 U.S. 937 (1972); W. Va., State v. Rhodes, 274 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1981).
94 Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
95 Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in
Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REv. 499, 500 (1976).
96 Note,supra note 95, at 501;seealso United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618 (2d Cir.
1966); Durham, 214 F.2d at 871.
97 See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 860-63 (2d ed. 1969).
98 Durham, 214 F.2d at 871-72.
99 Freeman, 357 F.2d at 618-20; Durham, 214 F.2d at 871-72. Some courts have given the
word "know" in M'Naghten a broader interpretation, requiring "knowledge 'fused with affect'
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cerns, psychiatrists find it impossible to.convey the full range of informa-
tion material to an assessment of the defendant's responsibility. 0 1 On
the other hand, the test allows expert witnesses to inject into their testi-
mony moral judgments more properly left to the jury. I0 2
Several jurisdictions, in an attempt to rectify the M'Naghlen test's
deficiencies, have supplemented the M'Naghten rule with the "irresistible
impulse" test.'0 3 This test retains the language of the M'Naghten rule,
but adds that insanity can also be a defense for a person who is unable
to refrain from doing the act-even though the individual may appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of the act.' 0 4 Advocates of the irresistible impulse
test claim that by including volitional as well as cognitive incapacities
within its criteria the test redresses the problems raised by the A'Naghten
rule. 0 5 Critics have nevertheless pointed out that the irresistible impulse
test still requires complete loss of mental capacity and fails to address
the importance of partial impairments. 10 6
To conform the notion of criminal responsibility with society's
evolving understanding of mental illness, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia proposed a third test for insanity in
Durham v. United States. I0 7 The court held that a defendant lacked crimi-
nal responsibility if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease
or defect. 0 8 The Durham court reasoned that this test would enable a
and assimilated by the whole personality." Wallach & Rubin, supra note 82, at 247, quoting
People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 800, 394 P.2d 959, 961-62, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274 (1964).
100 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 976;Freman, 357 F.2d at 619; AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra
note 28, at 386-87.
101 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 976. Nevertheless, one commentator has argued that M'Naghten
really only calls upon the psychiatrist to indicate whether the defendant was able to make
moral and ethical discriminations. Allen, The Rule of American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,
45 MARQ. L. REV. 494, 498 (1962).
102 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961); Note, M'Naghten Rule Aban-
doned in Favor of 'Justy Responsible" Test for Criminal Responsibility, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 617,
621 (1980).
103 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 81, § 36 at 269. For a list of states explicitly recog-
nizing that the irresistible impulse test modifies M'Naghten , see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
supra note 28, at 380 n.25.
104 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929); see also Keedy,
Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956, 988-89 (1952).
105 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 68 (irresistible impulse test initially perceived as
remedying M'Naghten's deficiencies).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1972). "[T]he irresistible
'impulse criterion presupposes a complete impairment of capacity for self-control." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
107 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
108 Id. at 874-75. The Durham Court did not explain its concept of "product of" which led
to numerous problems with applying the test. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 81, § 38 at
288. Eventually, in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia incorporated a qualification into its
definition of "mental disease" that made the product test more workable. The court there
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jury to consider all relevant aspects of a defendant's personality without
restricting the scope of expert testimony. 109 Other authorities, however,
have viewed the product test as illusory "because no psychiatrist would
be able to deny the possibility of a causal connection between the illness
and the act," thus permitting the conclusion that a defendant is never
criminally responsible for any acts following the onset of a mental ab-
normality. 1 10 The Durham product rule might also tend to cause juries to
rely exclusively on expert testimony in making determinations of mental
disease or defect."' The magnitude of the problem of conclusory expert
testimony eventually led even Judge Bazelon, the author of the Durham
opinion, to reject the product test. 1 2
The American Law Institute has proposed a fourth standard which
attempts to join medical science and social purpose in a functional
rule." 13 Under the ALI rule, a defendant is not criminally responsible if
at the time of the criminal conduct the accused, because of a mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to
the requirements of the law.' 14
Advocates of the ALI standard assert that it encompasses an indi-
stated that mental disease or defect "includes any abnormal mental condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls." Id. at 851. Thus, the court established a substantiality test for the relationship
between the disease and the criminal act. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit later rejected the product test in favor of the ALI test. Brawner, 471 F.2d
at 973. For further discussion of the ALI test, see infra text accompanying notes 113-19. A
form of the product test was originally followed by New Hampshire courts. See State v. Jones,
50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871). Presently, only New Hampshire applies the product test.
109 214 F.2d at 875-76; see also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (purpose of product test was to enable jury to consider all information advanced by
relevant scientific disciplines).
110 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1016 (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in part); see also United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 1968) (if defendant had a mental illness, any act might be
termed a product of the illness).
I I I The problem of conclusory expert testimony has been noted by several courts. See
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 978-79 (experts may effectively decide issue of responsibility under prod-
uct test); Washington, 390 F.2d at 453 (under product test, psychiatric labels substitute for
facts and the analysis underlying them); Freeman, 357 F.2d at 621 (under product test, psychi-
atrists function as jury).
112 See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1010 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part).
113 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 82, at 257.
114 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Almost all federal
courts now use the ALI test. See Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Frazier, 458 F.2d 911
(8th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States,
407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler,
393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Freeman,
357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); Currens,
290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). Nineteen states have also adopted the ALI test. For cases and
statutes, see Note, Modern Insanity Tests-Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 88, 107-08 & n.231
(1976).
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vidual's entire mental condition, both cognitive and volitional.' 15 Addi-
tionally, by requiring only lack of substantial capacity rather than total
impairment, the rule recognizes that partial impairment of mental ca-
pacity may preclude criminal responsibility. 1 6 The ALI standard en-
ables experts to communicate their observations in a simplified manner,
without the dangers of "expert dominance and encroachment on the
jury's function" that were present with the Durham test. 1 7 Critics argue,
however, that the ALI test still invites conclusory expert testimony be-
cause of the use of "result" language.'18 Some critics have stated that
the "substantial impairment" element is vague and therefore susceptible
to personal interpretation by jurors. l19
All of these insanity tests necessitate factual determinations. The
burden of proof on factual issues is important to the outcome of any
115 See Freeman, 357 F.2d at 622; Chandler, 393 F.2d at 926 (ALI test demands unrestricted
inquiry into the whole personality of the defendant); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra
note 28, at 383. In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit completely rejected any cognitive test, reasoning that an abnor-
mality in the cognitive function is neither sufficient nor necessary. Id. at 774 n.32. Under the
rule set forth in Brawner, a defendant may request deletion of the cognitive phase when there
is no evidence of cognitive impairment. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 992.
116 See Shapiro, 383 F.2d at 685; Freeman, 357 F.2d at 622-23; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28,
at 87; W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 81, § 38 at 293.
117 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 983. Brawner, concerned with the expert domination problem,
requires the judge to instruct the jury on the expanded definition of "mental disease or de-
fect" adopted in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 471 F.2d at
983. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requires
pretestimonial instruction of expert witnesses to ensure that the jury is informed of the ex-
perts' underlying reasons and approach, and is "not confronted with ultimate opinions on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis." Id. at 1006; see also id. at 1006 n.82, 1008 (Note to Appendix B).
The court thus emphasized that the jury is not to be made to feel that it is foreclosed from its
own evaluation of the defendant's sanity by the opinions of experts.
118 See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1027 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part) ("Where a psychiatrist
would formerly have testified that the act was not the 'product' of the disease, he can now
assert that the disease of the defendant does not entail as a 'result' the kind of impairment
that could have produced the act in question.").
119 Wade, 426 F.2d at 77-78 (Trask, J., dissenting). Fear of such personal interpretation by
jurors has also led courts and commentators alike to reject a fifth insanity test, the "justly
responsible" rule, included as an alternative to the majority ALI test. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01 alternative (a) to 1 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Rhode Island is the only state that has
adopted this fifth test. See State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979). The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island reasoned that jurors must always resolve questions of the degree of mental
impairment according to a collective sense ofjustice. Id. at 476-77. The court found that only
the justly responsible test adequately conveyed this duty to the jury. Id. For further discus-
sion of this topic, see generally Note, supra note 102. Proponents of the standard hoped that it
would encourage the jury to consider the factual background and expert testimony in light of
a community sense of justice rather than simply base its decision on expert opinion. See
Browner, 471 F.2d at 1034 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part). Other courts have rejected this
approach, however, because it relies on a highly abstract and vague concept of justice which
permits jurors to make individual determinations of justice through unreviewable personal
criteria. See, e.g., Brawner, 471 F.2d at 988-89.
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trial. When a defendant raises the insanity defense, however, allocation
of the burden of proof becomes crucial because it determines in part
whether insanity negates mens rea, 20 which is an essential element of
almost every crime. 121  Thus, allocation of the burden of proof deter-
mines whether the prosecution must disprove the defendant's insanity as
part of its case in chief.
B. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF
INSANITY
The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all ele-
ments constituting the crime charged 122 in order to convict a defendant
in a criminal trial.1 23 While the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
is a basic tenet of our criminal justice system, 124 defendants may raise an
affirmative defense which places facts in issue that either negate or jus-
tify elements of the crime or acts established by the prosecution. 125
When a defendant raises an affirmative defense, such as insanity, the
prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt by negating that defense
by a preponderance of the evidence.1 26
Because a defendant's sanity is presumed in all criminal trials, 127
the prosecution can establish its case without having to establish the
defendant's sanity unless the accused places sanity in issue.1 28 If sanity
120 See Note, supra note 95, at 502-504; see also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 81, § 10
at 46-48. LaFave and Scott conclude that proof of insanity is proof that the defendant lacked
the requisite mental state for the crime charged. Id. § 10 at 47, § 36 at 270. This conclusion
rests heavily upon In Re Winship, which held that due process requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime ... charged."
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Winship, however, was subsequently severely undercut by the
Court's holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), that the burden of proof on
affirmative defenses does not fall within the due process test of Winship. For further discus-
sion of the relationship between insanity and mens rea, see infra notes 158-178 and accompa-
nying text.
121 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 81, § 8 at 44 n.13, §28 at 195-98.
122 The elements of a crime are: a specified act or omission; usually a concurring mental
state; certain attendant circumstances; and a specified harmful result. Id. § 8 at 45 n. 13.
123 Id. § 8 at 44.
124 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The stan-
dard is designed to safeguard the presumption of innocence afforded in our free society. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). In a criminal trial, the presumption of innocence
mandates that the defendant be acquitted unless proven guilty. Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 458-59 (1895).
125 Comment, The Burden of Proof or Extreme Emotional Disturbance and Insanity: The Deteriora-
tion of Due Process, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 79, 80 (1979).
126 Id. at 80 & n. 11. In somes states, such as Illinois, the prosecution must disprove affirma-
tive defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3.2 (1981).
127 H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 80, at 214-15; Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Federal
Criminal Cases, 31 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 30, 46 (1963).
128 H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 80, at 214. The Court stated in Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469, 486 (1895) (dictum), that to require the government to prove defendant's sanity in
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is an issue, the defendant must initially meet the burden of production
on that issue; 129 should defendant fail, the prosecution does not have to
put forward any evidence of sanity.130
Authorities differ, however, concerning who has the ultimate bur-
den of proof of insanity-the risk of nonpersuasion31-and by what
measure.' 32 The defendant must persuade by a preponderance of the
evidence in some jurisdictions, while in others the prosecution must per-
suade beyond a reasonable doubt. 33 One commentator suggests that
courts and legislatures have based their allocation of the burden of per-
suasion for insanity on their perception of the relationship between san-
ity and mens rea. i3 4
Under one view, the presumption of sanity is merely a procedural
convenience to relieve the prosecution of proving sanity when it is not in
issue.135 Once the defendant has satisfied the burden of production, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the presumption of sanity has no further evidentiary signifi-
cance. t36 The rationale for this view is that a mentally diseased person
is incapable of committing a crime. 137 This definition of sanity posits
that sanity is necessary to form the requisite culpable state of mind-
mens rea-and hence is an essential element of the crime. 138 Therefore,
in jurisdictions where proof of insanity is considered "inseparable from
every case "would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime,
and in most cases be unnecessary."
129 Practice varies as to how much evidence the defendant must introduce to place insanity
in issue. The prevailing view is that an accused must produce enough evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt of his or her mental responsibility for an act. W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rrsura
note 81, § 40 at 313. Some states, however, require only a "scintilla" of evidence. Id.
130 Id. § 40 at 312.
131 The burden of proof consists of two elements, the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion. Id. § 8 at 44.
132 Id. § 8 at 47-48, § 40 at 313.
133 Id. LaFave and Scott favor the latter rule. Id. § 8 at 48. The defendant must rebut the
presumption of sanity by a preponderance of the evidence in twenty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Note, supra note 95, at 503 & n.35 (collecting cases and statutes).
134 Note, supra note 95, at 505.
135 See Orfield, supra note 127, at 46.
136 Note, supra note 95, at 504 n.37 (citing J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 575-76 (1898)). Professor Thayer argued that "a presump-
tion itself contributes no evidence, and has no probative quality." J. THAYER, supra, at 575-
76.
137 Louisell & Hazard, Inranilp as a Defense: The Bircated Trial, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 805, 805
(1961).
138 SeeDavis, 160 U.S. at 484-85. Although the Supreme Court in Davis adopted a "rule of
procedure for the federal courts" by requiring the government to negate insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt once the defendant introduced evidence on that issue, Leland, 343 U.S. at
797-98, as a constitutional matter legislatures could require the defendant to prove his or her
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 797-99 (dictum). For further discussion of
Supreme Court decisions affecting the burden of proof, see infra note 143.
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the ascertainment of guilt,"' 39 the prosecution bears the burden of prov-
ing the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' 40
The opposing view is that the prosecution can establish guilt sepa-
rately from proof of sanity, therefore the defendant must bear the bur-
den of persuasion as well as that of production.1 4 ' Jurisdictions with
this view hold that sanity is not relevant to the determination of guilt. 
42
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia require the defendant
to rebut the presumption of sanity by a preponderance of all the
evidence. 14 3
139 Louisell & Hazard, supra note 137, at 805.
140 W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 81, § 8 at 48.
141 In most jurisdictions applying this rule, the defendant must establish insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence, a less demanding quantum of proof than the beyond reason-
able doubt standard. Id. § 8 at 47-48. Under Leland, however, the defendant can be required
to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 343 U.S. at 798-99; see also supra note 138.
142 See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 722, 475 P.2d 671, 672 (1970) ("Whether in-
sanity is an element of the crime of murder which must be proven by the state is a question
that has been well-settled. Insanity is an affirmative proposition which the defendant must
establish by a preponderance of proof."), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); see also Common-
wealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 50, 103 A.2d 694, 697 (1954) (dictum that defendant has
burden of proving affirmative defenses of insanity, alibi and self-defense by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence). The Supreme Court of Washington advanced another rationale in
State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 497-98, 76 P. 98, 102 (1904), where it stated that because in-
sanity is "easily feigned, and difficult to disprove," it is right in principle to impose the burden
of persuasion of insanity on the defendant. See generally, Note, supra note 34. Under this view,
the treatment of the insanity defense is analogous to a bifurcated trial in which the determi-
nation of guilt is made in a separate proceeding prior to the determination of insanity. Note,
supra note 95, at 503 n.34. For further discussion of bifurcation, insanity and mens rea, see
infia note 161.
143 See Note, supra note 95, at 503 n.35 (collecting cases and commentary); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981). In Davis, 160 U.S. at 484-85, the Supreme Court established a rule
of procedure for federal courts, holding that the prosecution must negate insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt once the defendant introduces evidence on the issue. In Leland, however, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute placing the burden of proof on the de-
fendant. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The Court found that requiring the defend-
ant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt was not inconsistent with the prosecution's
burden of establishing deliberate and premeditated killing beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at
794-95, since the state did not require the accused to disprove the prosecution's showing of the
statutorily required mens rea. Id. at 795-96. Finally, the Court held that due process does not
require the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity in all criminal cases. Id. at 798-99.
Justice Frankfurter dissented because he believed sanity and culpability are inextricably re-
lated; thus, when sanity is in issue, the prosecution must prove the absence of insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 803-04.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, notably In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), placed the vitality of Leland in question. In these
later decisions, the Court appeared to be expanding a constitutional mandate that the prose-
cution bear the ultimate burden of proof for issues essential to a determination of guilt. See
Comment, supra note 125, at 81-82. In Winship the Court held that due process requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime
. . . charged." 397 U.S. at 364. This high standard of proof protects important interests of
both the state and individual defendants because it reduces the risk of erroneous convictions
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The idea that insanity negates mens rea rests on the assumption
that mens rea contains an element of moral culpability.144 Since courts
have traditionally viewed insane persons as incapable of appreciating
what conduct is immoral, 14 5 they cannot possess mens rea, hence they
based on factual errors, thereby maintaining the respect and confidence of the community in
the criminal justice system. Id.
While Winship mandated only that a court determine whether a given fact was an ele-
ment of the crime charged in order to decide whether the state could constitutionally allocate
the burden of proving that fact to the accused, the Court subsequently extended Winship to
factual issues which were not express elements of the crime as defined by statute. Note, supra
note 95, at 507. The issue in Mullany was whether Maine could constitutionally require a
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. 421 U.S. at 684-85. The heat of passion defense would negate a pre-
sumption of malice, thereby reducing murder to manslaughter. Id. at 686-87. The Court
struck down the Maine Rule, reasoning that it was contrary to Winship because the law re-
lieved the prosecution of the burden of proving malice-the fact that differentiated murder
and manslaughter-beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 699-701. While neither Wzzi)hip nor
MAullany concerned the insanity defense per se, many commentators believed that the broad
position enunciated in these cases overruled Lelandsub silentio. See United States v. Greene,
489 F.2d 1145, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that because the
factual issue of sanity is an essential element of almost all crimes, Winship requires the prose-
cution always to prove sanity whenever a defendant places it in issue), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
977 (19-74).
In 1976, however, the Court in Rivera v. Delaware did not take the opportunity to overrule
a statute placing the burden of proof for insanity on the defendant. 429 U.S. 877 (1976)
(appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question). A dismissal for want of a substan-
tial federal question is treated as a decision on the merits and accorded precedential weight.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). The Rivera decision thus effectively halts any
lower court's attempt to extend the Mullan rule to insanity cases, as well as signals that the
Leland rule is still valid. Comment, supra note 125, at 89-90
Finally, in Patterson v. New York, the Court upheld a New York statute placing the burden
of proof for extreme emotional disturbance on the defendant, over the defendant's argument
that, under Mullaney, this law was a violation of due process. 432 U.S. 197, 205-06. The
Court viewed this affirmative defense as a separate issue which did not negate any of the
elements necessary to constitute the crime. Id. at 206-07. Therefore, once the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements constituting the crime, the due process test of
Winship was satisfied and the defendant could be required to sustain his defense. Id. at 206.
For further discussion of Patterson, see Comment, supra note 125, at 90-95.
144 Note, supra note 34, at 503. The Court in Davis adopted this view of mens rea: " 'T~o
constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an
unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.'" 160 U.S. at 484 (quoting 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 195 (W. Lewis ed. 1898)). Blackstone, however, placed the burden
of proving insanity on the defendant. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 201 (W. Lewis ed.
1898). But see J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 74 (1890)
("[Mens rea] is a mischievous phrase, because it is usually understood to mean that legal guilt
cannot exist in the absence of moral guilt . . . . The only true meaning which can be at-
tached to it is that every definition of a crime involves some mental element .... "); see also
Note, supra note 34, at 509-10. On the distinction between "wrongfulness" and "criminality,"
see Weihofen, Capacity to Appreciate "Wrongfulness" or "Criminality" Under the ALI Model Penal
Code Test of Mental Responsibility, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 27 (1967).
145 See, e.g., Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843); see also supra text
accompanying notes 93-102.
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are not blameworthy. 146 Under this view, proof of sanity is an essential
element of the prosecution's case in chief.147
The opposing view of mens rea is that it can exist even if the de-
fendant is insane, thus proof of sanity is not an element of the case in
chief.148 First, the mere existence of the insanity defense suggests that
insanity and mens rea are separate issues and that they are distinguish-
able, coexisting states of mind. As one commentator has stated, "If legal
insanity is no more than an incapacity to possess the 'guilty mind' re-
quired for crime, then there is no reason to plead it as a special defense
to criminal liability."' 49 In other words, if insanity were merely the ab-
sence of mens rea, the insanity defense would simply be a device for
committing those who are not guilty of any criminal act. Moreover, al-
though mens rea and insanity frequently involve similar factual deter-
minations, "the insanity defense is broader than the mens rea
concept."' 150 Insofar as mental illness is offered to disprove state of
mind, it is thus material to the mens rea determination "only if it is
reasonable to believe that it influenced the defendant's conscious aware-
ness in such a manner that he lacked the state of mind required for
liability."151
Mens rea can also be defined as morally neutral. 52 Technically,
mens rea refers to the specific mental states found in the statutory defini-
tions of crimes, not to "guilty mind."'I53 The basic elements of mens rea
are intent and knowledge.' 54 To act intentionally, an individual must
146 Note, supra note 34, at 503. Goldstein and Katz conclude that proof of insanity is proof
of the absence of mens rea. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 28, at 864-65; see also United States
v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961) (anyone who lacks capacity to choose and to
control himself could not possess "guilty mind" necessary for crime). In Currens the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit developed a new test for insanity which would relate mental
disease to "guilty mind" or mens rea in a way that the jury could understand. For further
discussion of Currens, see supra note 115.
147 Note, supra note 34, at 503-05.
148 See id. at 501-02.
149 Id. at 509.
150 Note, supra note 89, at 734; see also Note, supra note 95, at 512. Another commentator
explains the distinction between mens rea and insanity based on the nature of the inquiry.
Investigation into mens rea assumes that the person is mentally responsible and then asks
whether that person acted with guilty intent. The insanity inquiry, however, asks whether
the defendant was a responsible person in the first place. Note, The Right and Responsibility of a
Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REv. 927, 950
(1981).
151 Dix, Mental Illness, Criminal Intent, and the Bifurcated Trial, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD. 559,
565.
152 Note, supra note 34, at 504; see also State v. Buzynski, 330 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Me. 1974)
(court ruled that insanity and mens rea can coexist by construing mens rea devoid of any
notion of mental control).
t53 Note, supra note 34, at 510.
154 Id. The MODEL PENAL CODE sets forth requirements for criminal culpability:
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simply engage in conduct purposely to cause the proscribed result. 55 To
act knowingly, the person need only be "practically certain that his con-
duct will cause the forbidden result." 156 These definitions do not man-
date that the person have either the ability to refrain from causing the
result or the knowledge that causing the result is morally
reprehensible. 157
1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in section 2.05, a person
is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.
2) Kinds of culpability defined.
A) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
2) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the exist-
ence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
B) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
2) if the element involves the result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practi-
cally certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
C) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense which he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material ele-
ment exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and the purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
D) Negligently
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purposes
of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation
from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable man in his
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
155 See supra note 154; Note, supra note 34, at 510.
156 Note, supra note 34, at 510-11. The mens ra standard and definition of insanity may
occasionally coincide such that a defendant who pleads insanity will be required to disprove
an essential element of the prosecution's case. Note, supra note 95, at 513. To determine
whether or not they overlap to this extent requires a close analysis of the statutory language as
to whether it requires deliberate and premeditated malice. Id. at 515. For example, the
author of that Note contrasted two cases as follows. In United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d
1145 (1973), the defendant was charged with felony murder which did not require deliberate
and premeditated malice, thus sanity was not an element of the offense. In United States v.
Brawner, however, the prosecution had to show that the defendant acted in a deliberate, cal-
culated manner in order to convict him of first degree murder. 471 F.2d 969, 998-99 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (en banc). In Brawner, therefore, the prosecution had to prove these elements of
mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. See Note, supra note 95, at 516-18. That author empha-
sized, however, that this interrelationship occurs only in an extremely small number of cases.
Id. at 513.
157 Note, supra note 95, at 511.
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Finally, the insanity tests focus on volitional impairment-the inca-
pacity to refrain from causing a certain result-and cognitive impair-
ment-the inability to know that causing the result is wrong. 58 One
commentator illustrates the distinction as follows:
[A] person may be capable of formulating a plan with an awareness
that carrying out the plan will likely result in the death of another, and yet
be incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong. In
a state in which the mens rea for murder is premediation and the test of
insanity is the M'Naghten Rule, there is no substantial overlap between
the facts necessary to prove mens rea and the elements of insanity.1 59
When mens rea is defined in terms of the conscious mind's cognitive and
volitional functions, 16° a legally insane defendant can act in such a way
as to satisfy the formal, definitional elements of the crime. Guilt, in the
sense of whether the defendant committed all the specified elements of
the crime, can thus be established prior to the determination of whether
the defendant had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law.161
Consequently, the prosecution does not have to prove sanity in its direct
case.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 93-119.
159 Note, supra note 95, at 512; see also Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 834 (1977)
("most mentally abnormal offenders are fully capable of thinking about their criminal act
before they do it, turning it over in their minds, planning the act, and then performing it in
accordance with their preconceived plan").
160 See,e.g., State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965); Arenella, supra note
159, at 834.
161 In a bifurcated trial, the trial is formally split into a guilt phase and an insanity phase.
This two stage procedure implies that guilt can be completely adjudicated without an inquiry
into the defendant's sanity, since there would be no reason for bifurcation unless an insane
defendant can entertain the required mens rea. Note, supra note 34, at 500. The purpose of
bifurcation is to eliminate from the basic trial on guilt or innocence the mass of highly emo-
tional evidence on the defendant's insanity which has no bearing on the issue of guilt. Loui-
sell & Hazard, supra note 137, at 808 n.11.
This objective has not been realized, at least in California. In People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d
330, 202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949), the California Supreme Court held that evidence bearing on
mental disease or defect was admissible on the mental state element in the guilt phase of the
trial. This ruling has led Louisell and Hazard to advocate abolition of the bifurcated system.
Louisell & Hazard, supra note 137, at 830; see also State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715
(1970) (allowing evidence of mental illness in both portions of bifurcated trial emasculates the
intended purposes of the bifuracted procedure; due process requires that evidence of mental
illness be admissible in criminal trial because it is relevant to state of mind, thus bifurcated
procedure denies defendants due process). But see Dix, supra note 151, at 575 (proposes re-
structuring the bifurcated system by splitting the phases between those issues involving proof
of mental illness and those that do not).
Five jurisdictions currently provide for bifurcated trials: D.C., see Holmes v. United
States, 363 F.2d 281 (1966) (decision to bifurcate trial within broad discretion of judge); Cal.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1980); Me., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 59
(Supp. 1983); Minn., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02 (6)(2) (1983); Wis., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.175
(West 1980).
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The separateness of guilt and insanity has received extensive analy-
sis in an analogous context, court-compelled psychiatric examination of
defendants who raise insanity as a defense or whose competency to stand
trial is at issue. A court can require defendants to cooperate in a com-
plete psychiatric examination, and their responses to questions specifi-
cally designed to probe the issue of sanity may be introduced in the
responsibility phase1 62 of the trial.163 Although the compelled psychiat-
ric examination has generated much commentary on whether it is an
infringement on the accused's right against self-incrimination,1 64 a ma-
jority of courts have held there is no violation.165 The premise of these
decisions is that the testimony from the results of the examinations is
being used only to determine whether the defendant may be held crimi-
nally responsible and not to prove the guilt of the accused. Thus, the
defendant is not being made the " 'deluded instrument of his own
162 "Responsibility phase" refers to the part of the trial in which evidence is presented on
the insanity issue to determine whether an individual may be held criminally responsible for
his or her conduct.
163 Note, The Fih Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric Examinations: Implications of Estelle v.
Smith, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 275, 275 (1982). Two theories for analyzing the fifth amend-
ment's application to sanity examinations have been advanced. Some courts have found that
a defendant's disclosures in these examinations are non-testimonial (i.e., they do not establish
guilt) and, therefore, are not protected by the fifth amendment. See United States v. Baird,
414 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); People v. Nelson, 92 Ill.
App. 3d 35, 39-40, 415 N.E.2d 688, 693 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 900 (1981). The Supreme
Court rejected this theory in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Other courts have taken
the approach endorsed in Estelle that the defendant waives his fifth amendment privilege with
respect to psychiatric examinations when the defendant raises the issue of insanity. 451 U.S.
at 465. See generally Wesson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceed-
ings, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 697, 722-24; Wesson, Miranda On the Couch: An Approach to Problems of
Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel and Miranda Warnings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of
Criminal Defendants, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 403, 431-38 (1975).
164 The prevailing opinion of such commentators is that these compelled examinations do
violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege. See generaly Danforth, Death Knellfor the
Pre-Trial Mental Examination?" Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 489
(1965); Comment, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination:L
An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REv. 648 (1970); Comment,
Pretrial Mental Examinations in Maine: Are They Mechanisms for Compelling Self-Incrimination? 18
ME. L. REv. 96 (1966); Note, Mental Examinations of Defendants Who Plead Insanity: Problems of
Self-Incrimination, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 366 (1967); Comment, Changing Standards for Compulsogy
Mental Examinations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 270; Comment, Compulsoy Mental Examinations and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 671.
165 See United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976); Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bohle,
445 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir.
1968); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1967) (en bane), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 949 (197 1); see also United States v. Whitlock, 663 F.2d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no
infringement of right against self-incrimination where challenged testimony was elicited
solely for purpose of supporting experts' conclusion that defendant was criminally responsible
for her actions at time of offense).
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conviction.' "166
Where the compelled testimony is used to determine guilt or the
nature of punishment, however, the Court has found a violation of the
fifth amendment. 6 7 The Court has reasoned that, because of the grav-
ity of the decision made in the penalty phase, any attempt by the prose-
cution to establish the defendant's future dangerousness168 through
compelled psychiatric testimony would contravene the fifth amend-
ment. 69 Thus, the Court has found no distinction for fifth amendment
purposes between the guilt and punishment phases of a capital case,170
but has noted explicitly that this holding would not apply where the
defendant raises the issue of sanity at trial.17 '
Other courts have held that if compelled psychiatric testimony is
used only to support expert witnesses' conclusions that the defendant
was sane at the time of the offense, and not to establish guilt, there is no
question of self-incrimination. 172 As in the admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence, the central question is whether the prosecution is using
the compelled testimony to establish the defendant's guilt. The courts'
conclusion that using compelled testimony to determine sanity does not
create problems of self-incrimination, as it would if it were used to deter-
mine guilt, implicitly demonstrates that insanity and mens rea can coex-
ist. To find otherwise would mean that courts are allowing the
prosecution to use "illegal" evidence to establish an essential element of
the crime charged, the mens rea. Proof of sanity is thus not part of the
166 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961)).
167 Id. In Estelle, the prosecution introduced psychiatric testimony at the death penalty
phase of a Texas murder trial, based upon a court-ordered psychiatric examination to deter-
mine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The defendant was not advised before the
pre-trial psychiatric examination that he had a right to remain silent and that any statement
he made could be used affirmatively to persuade the jury to return the death sentence. Id.
Since the defendant had no opportunity to refuse to submit to an examination for that pur-
pose, the Court held that admission of this testimony violated the defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 469.
168 In Texas, capital cases require bifurcated proceedings-a guilt phase and a penalty
phase. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 3.071(a) (Vernon 1981). The judge must impose
the death penalty if the jury affirmatively answers three questions on which the State has the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. One of these questions is whether the defendant
is likely to be dangerous in the future. Id. at 458. In Estelle, the State's psychiatrist testified
that, among other things, Smith's previous behavior was irreversible, that he would commit
other such criminal acts given the opportunity, and that he had "no remorse or sorrow for
what he [had] done." Id. at 459-60. The jury answered the three questions affirmatively.
169 Id. at 463.
170 Id. at 462-63.
17' Id. at 466.
172 See, e.g., Whitock, 663 F.2d at 1107. There the court stated: "Had [the experts'] testi-
mony been admitted for its tendency to buttress appellant's guilt, the self-incrimination ques-
tion would generate grave concern. But the challenged testimony was elicited solely for the
purpose of supporting the experts' conclusion that appellant was criminally responsible for
her actions at the time of the offense." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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prosecution's case in chief.' 73
IV. ANALYSIS
Courts can admit illegally obtained evidence to rebut the insanity
defense without jeopardizing constitutional principles under certain lim-
ited circumstances. Courts have held that police misconduct is suffi-
ciently deterred when the prosecution is barred from using illegally
obtained evidence in its case in chief to establish the accused's guilt.1 74
Under the insanity-rebuttal exception, courts would still achieve this
level of deterrence. Moreover, the rationale underlying the impeach-
ment exception is applicable to insanity-rebuttal: defendants cannot be
allowed to establish an insanity defense only through experts and
thereby escape impeachment. Finally, there exists a special need in tri-
als where insanity is the issue to present all relevant and probative evi-
dence on the defendant's insanity to the trier of fact.
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RATIONALE AND THE INSANITY-REBUTTAL
EXCEPTION
It is well-settled that the exclusionary rule provides adequate deter-
rence if illegal evidence is not used to establish guilt. The efficacy of
using illegal evidence to rebut the insanity defense therefore turns on the
separateness of the guilt and insanity issues, specifically, whether prov-
ing insanity is inconsistent with proving the elements of the offense
charged.175 A determination of who bears the burden of proof partially
resolves this problem.
L Invalid Applications of the Insanity-Rebuttal Exception
If sanity is an element of the crime that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, then clearly the introduction of illegally ob-
tained evidence to rebut the insanity defense would be constitutionally
impermissible. 176 Where sanity is viewed as necessary to form the requi-
site culpable state of mind,177 proof of sanity would be essential to estab-
173 See Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The State's use of the results of
a competency examination does not infringe upon a defendant's fifth amendment privilege
because it does not assist the State in proving any of the elements necessary to support the
imposition of a criminal punishment").
174 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
175 The insanity-rebuttal exception thus parallels the impeachment exception. For further
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 197-218.
176 Under this circumstance, the prosecution would be establishing guilt with illegally ob-
tained evidence by using the evidence to prove the existence of an element of the crime. This
would be an "affirmative" use of illegal evidence which the Court has repeatedly stated is
impermissible. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
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lishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Permitting
rebuttal use of illegally obtained evidence under these circumstances
would thus allow the prosecution to obtain criminal convictions by un-
lawful means. 178
Furthermore, the proposed verdict "guilty but insane," adopted by
several states and currently being considered by several others,1 79 might
create another situation in which rebuttal use of illegal evidence would
infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights. Under this verdict, the
defendant is sentenced to a prison term and receives psychiatric treat-
ment there rather than being committed to a mental institution. 180
Those individuals who recover before their prison sentence expires must
complete the balance of their sentence in prison. 8 1 The significance of
this verdict is that, because the defendant's mental illness was not severe
enough to impair his mens rea, he is held criminally responsible. 182 De-
fendants who are legally insane, however, cannot be found "guilty but
insane."' 8 3 The prosecution could not use illegally obtained evidence to
rebut insanity in this situation because of the possibility that the trier of
fact will select the lesser verdict under which the mentally ill defendant
is punished by being sent to prison. Thus, use of illegal evidence in a
case resulting in a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict could mean that the
prosecution is using illegal evidence affirmatively to determine
punishment.
The result of this use of illegal evidence would therefore be analo-
gous to the result in Estelle v. Smith ,184 where the Supreme Court barred
the introduction of testimony from a compelled psychiatric examination
of the defendant at the sentencing phase. The Court stated that using
178 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
179 Seven states have adopted the "guilty but mentally ill verdict" in addition to the tradi-
tional verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity." See supra note 28. For further discussion
of this new verdict, see infra note 186, and text accompanying notes 174-184. The plea and
verdict for the insanity defense throughout the United States today is "not guilty by reason of
insanity." See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 81, § 40 at 316.
180 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 81, § 37 at 237. This verdict is to be used only
where the accused's mental illness is not severe enough to negate culpability, id., thus it ex-
pands the class of mentally ill offenders eligible to be found guilty. Id. § 34 at 239. For a
discussion of the problems with this proposal, see id. § 35 at 257-58. This verdict distinguishes
mental illness from legal insanity, acknowledging varying degrees of mental illness. Other
rules and proposals, such as diminished capacity, attempt to do this also. See generally
Arenella, supra note 159.
181 Note, supra note 79, at 258.
182 Id. at 253. Moreover, this verdict could imply that the state considers that the fullest
extent of mental illness, legal insanity, cannot coexist with mens rea. If so, admission of illegal
evidence for rebuttal purposes would be impermissible because the prosecution would be us-
ing it to establish an essential element of the crime, the defendant's mens rea.
183 Id. at 254.
184 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
[Vol. 74
1983] INSANITY-REBUTTAL EXCEPTION
this testimony at the sentencing stage would be tantamount to making
the defendant the "'deluded instrument' of his own execution." 185 The
prosecution cannot seek the imposition of a penalty, just as it cannot
establish guilt, by relying upon constitutionally impermissible
evidence. 186
2. Valid Applications of the Insanity-Rebuttal Exception
In jurisdictions placing the burden of proof for insanity on the de-
fendant, guilt is established separately from proof of sanity; proof of in-
sanity does not negate the mens rea necessary to establish the
defendant's guilt in the sense that he or she committed all elements of
the offense.1 8 7 Since sanity is not an element that the prosecution consti-
tutionally must prove to establish the guilt of the accused, 188 the intro-
duction of illegal evidence to rebut insanity would be permissible under
exclusionary theory because it would not be probative of guilt. The
court would thus satisfy the deterrence mandate because the prosecution
is denied affirmative use of the illegal evidence.
Nevertheless, the Hinckley court concluded that Miranda's deter-
rence rationale would not be satisfied if the government were merely
prohibited from using illegally obtained evidence in its case in chief.18 9
The court thus refused to allow the government to use evidence ob-
tained in violation of Miranda solely to rebut Hinckley's insanity de-
fense. 190 The court reasoned that the broad scope of evidence relevant
185 Id. at 462 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961)).
186 Yet, use of illegal evidence to rebut insanity in cases where the guilty but mentally ill
verdict is rendered is more analogous to the use of compelled psychiatric testimony on the
insanity issue than to its use in the sentencing phase. Courts have found no constitutional
violation where the prosecution uses compelled testimony to defeat an insanity claim. See
United States v. Whitlock, 663 F.2d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Similarly, rebuttal use of
illegal evidence in a trial where the trier of fact returns the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict
would mean only that the prosecution used the evidence to defeat the insanity claim. The
evidence is not necessarily probative of guilt. Subsequent imprisonment should not raise any
questions of constitutional violations.
187 See supra text accompanying notes 135-161.
188 See United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court held
that proof of sanity is not included in the elements of the crime of felony murder, stating, "If
that were the case, the Government would be required to produce evidence establishing san-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt as part of its direct case, before the defendant introduced an
iota of testimony, and that is not and never has been the law."
189 United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1982). John Hinckley was tried
for shooting President Reagan, the President's Press Secretary, a Secret Service agent, and a
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Officer. Id. at 117.
190 On the day of his arrest, Hinckley was held in custody first by the Metropolitan Police
and later by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 117. When the FBI assumed jurisdic-
tion over the case and took custody of Hinckley, two federal agents again advised him of his
rights. Although earlier he had asked the police to allow him to confer with counsel prior to
answering any questions, Hinckley informed the FBI agents that he would answer questions.
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to an insanity defense "[w]ill serve to enhance the possibility that any
retreat from [the Miranda] protections will be abused."1 9 1 Furthermore,
the court stated that to curtail the exclusionary rule in this manner
would provide "little or no deterrence of constitutional violations
against defendants whose sanity is the principal issue in the case."1 92
Underlying the Hinckley court's reasoning is the theory that so long
as there is some use for the illegal evidence, police will have an incentive
to violate the constitutional rights of suspects. The Supreme Court spe-
cifically rejected this theory in the context of the impeachment excep-
tion in Oregon v. Hass.193 The Court dismissed as a mere "speculative
possibility" the contention that an officer, having given Miranda warn-
ings, may, after a suspect has requested an attorney, continue to ques-
tion the individual in the hopes of gaining something "possibly [by]
uncovering impeachment material."1 94 Such an abuse of Miranda is even
more speculative in the context of rebutting the insanity defense. At the
time of the violation, the police would not know whether the defendant
wili raise the insanity defense at trial; they might not even be aware of
the suspect's mental state at the time of arrest.
Furthermore, the Hinckley court's fear that illegally obtained evi-
dence will be used to disprove the "principal issue" of the case misinter-
prets the application of the exclusionary rule. The rule is not applied on
Id. at 120 & n.35. During the ensuing interview, the agents elicited basic biographical data
such as his address, age, names of members of his family, and what he had been doing during
the last year. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 65, United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982). This questioning lasted only for twenty-five minutes. Hinckl, 672 F.2d at
122. Despite the background nature of this information, the questions were found to be an
interrogation. Id. at 123-24. Furthermore, both the district and appellate courts held that
not only the biographical information gathered but also any testimony by the agents relating
to Hinckley's demeanor during the interview must be excluded because the information was
obtained in violation of Miranda. Id. at 118. According to the court of appeals, Hinckley's
earlier request for counsel "precluded any interrogation until he had an opportunity to confer
with counsel," id., hence, any information connected with the interview was illegally ob-
tained. Id. at 133. Neither the defendant nor the court argued that these statements were
involuntary. This finding of illegality mandated that the government not use the evidence in
its direct case at trial. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
191 672 F.2d at 134. But see infra text accompanying notes 196-211. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court distinguished FBI and Secret Service agents from the "typical police of-
ficer," stating that the former have "special concerns" and are "fully aware of the critical
importance of their demeanor testimony about a suspect arrested in the course of an at-
tempted or actual assassination." Id. at 133-34. The court thus implied that, due to their
expertise and the greater importance of their cases, special agents may have a greater incen-
tive and propensity to engage in unconstitutional questioning of suspects. Yet, at least in
Hinckley, the record demonstrates these special agents were extremely sensitive to possible
constitutional violations and attempted to avoid them at all costs. See generally Appendix to
Brief for Appellant, United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
192 Hinckley. 672 F.2d at 134.
193 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
194 Id. at 723.
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the basis of whether the illegal evidence will go to the "principal issue"
of the case. On the contrary, the rule bars the prosecution only from
establishing the essential elements of the crime with illegal evidence.19 5
Proof of the elements of a crime does not necessarily include proof of
insanity, 196 even when sanity is the principal issue in a case.
Moreover, as the Illinois appellate court found in People v. Finke ,197
the use of illegally obtained evidence to rebut an insanity defense is vir-
tually indistinguishable from the use of such evidence for impeachment
purposes. In both situations the state is merely challenging the veracity
of statements made by the defendant. In Finkey, the defendant's sanity
was the principal issue in the case. 19 8 Finkey's psychiatrist concluded
that he suffered from pathological intoxication, 199 based upon the de-
fendant's statement that he had no independent recollection of the
events at issue.20 0 The state rebutted this expert testimony with illegally
obtained evidence, the testimony of a detective to whom the defendant
had revealed that he had some recall of the events charged.20 1 Applying
a balancing test in accordance with exclusionary jurisprudence,2 0 2 the
Btnkey court concluded that the extreme relevance of the statements to
the defendant's insanity defense outweighed the need for suppression of
195 Id.
196 Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. This reasoning also implies that the Hzklo, court considers
sanity an element of the crime, which is not the case. See supra text accompanying notes 141-
73. In the District of Columbia, the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity. D.C.
CODE. ANN. § 24-301(j)(1981).
197 105 Ill. App. 3d 230, 434 N.E.2d 18 (1982).
198 There was no question in Hinklq or Finkey that the defendants fired the guns that
wounded the victims. In Finky, the defendant ordered police officers, summoned because of
an altercation he was having with his wife, off his property, and shot and wounded several
officers in the process. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 231, 434 N.E.2d at 19.
199 Pathological intoxication is an acute organic brain syndrome that, according to the
psychiatrist, caused Finkey to lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law or to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. Finkey never took the stand, so the evidence could not be used for impeachment
purposes. As in Hinckl/e, these statements were excluded from the state's case in chief on a
pretrial motion in limine because they were obtained in violation of Miranda. Although the
Fizkq court did not expressly state the basis of the violation, it did note that the statements
were made in a conversation between the detective and the defendant which occurred "in the
defendant's hospital room, after the defendant had been charged and had retained an attor-
ney. Only Detective Collins and the defendant were present." Finkq, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 231,
434 N.E.2d at 19. The facts in Finkey indicate a possible key difference from Hinckly. In the
latter case, the motion to suppress the rebuttal use of the evidence came before the trial, thus
the experts' testimony was not available to determine what was relied upon in reaching their
conclusions. Another distinction lies in the fact that Finkey did not object during the trial to
the admission of the illegally obtained evidence for rebuttal, which would ordinarily be dis-
positive of the issue. See People v. Martinico, 101 Ill. App. 3d 250, 253, 427 N.E.2d 1340,
1342 (1981). The Illinois appellate court, however, ignored this point in its analysis and hold-
ing. Finkq, 105 I1. App. 3d at 232-33, 434 N.E.2d at 19-20.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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the illegally obtained evidence, holding the evidence admissible solely
for rebuttal purposes. 20 3
While the Hinckley court emphasized the dangers of police miscon-
duct if it were to allow this rebuttal use of illegal evidence, 20 4 the Finkey
court stressed the injustice of allowing the defendant to establish a
fraudulent insanity defense:
Just as a defendant cannot be allowed to directly perjure himself and then
hide behind the fifth amendment, he cannot be allowed to prz'nafacie es-
tablish an insanity defense by his representations to a psychiatrist without
affording the State an opportunity to challenge the veracity of those
statements.
20 5
The Illinois appellate court recognized that a defendant can establish a
fraudulent insanity defense that the prosecution cannot challenge be-
cause the relevant evidence was illegally obtained. An analogous situa-
tion prompted the Supreme Court to adopt the impeachment exception
in Walder v. United States.206 Extension of the impeachment rationale
to rebuttal of insanity merely affords prosecutors the opportunity to
challenge the truth of the defendant's statements that form the basis for
the experts' medical conclusions on the accused's insanity. The defend-
ant should not be allowed to establish an insanity defense with lies,
thereby perverting the shield provided by Miranda, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent statements.20 7
The analogy to the impeachment rationale can be carried one step
further. In permitting rebuttal use of illegal evidence, the Fnkey court
recognized that the enormous influence the defendant's statements had
upon his expert's testimony created an imbalance in favor of the de-
fense. Thus, the court sanctioned the prosecution's use of illegal evi-
dence concerning the issue to put both sides on equal footing. Other
courts have similarly justified admission of statements from compelled
psychiatric examinations by emphasizing the "overwhelming difficulty"
of responding to psychiatric testimony.20 8 These courts recognize that
the defense, by introducing expert testimony based on a psychiatric ex-
amination of the defendant, constructively puts the defendant on the
203 105 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20.
204 Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 134; see also supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
205 Finkey, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20.
206 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The Court reasoned:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence
unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own ad-
vantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such
an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 65; see also Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
207 See id. at 226; Wader, 347 U.S. at 65.
208 Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1982).
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stand.20 9 Therefore, these courts allow the state to have its own psychia-
trists examine the defendant and testify as to their conclusions.210
This "testimony by proxy" theory is applicable to the situation
where illegal evidence is used to rebut expert testimony on the defend-
ant's insanity. Psychiatrists base their conclusions as to whether a de-
fendant could appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or was
able to conform that conduct to the law upon the defendant's state-
ments to them about the events. 211 Since the insanity defense allows
defendants to "testify" through statements made to third parties with-
out ever taking the stand, courts should not permit them to insulate
themselves from impeachment and contradiction merely by testifying
through proxies.212 An expert's testimony should be subject to rebuttal
with pertinent statements made by the defendant, such as in Finke, 213
or by lay testimony on the defendant's demeanor, as in Hinckey.214 The
Hinckly court rejected the testimony by proxy theory because it could
find no basis to distinguish the insanity defense from other affirmative
defenses.215 Yet the insanity defense does differ from other affirmative
defenses such as alibi, duress and self-defense.216 Rebuttal of these other
affirmative defenses would go to the prosecution's case in chief because
some of these defenses directly negate the criminal act charged, as with
209 Id.
210 Id. The Battie court stated that once the defendant introduces psychiatric testimony he
waives his fifth amendment privilege "in the same manner as would the defendant's election
to testify at trial." Id. at 701-02. Moreover, the Battie court held that the state's use of the
results of an incompetency examination does not violate the fifth amendment because the
state cannot use the results to prove any of the elements necessary to support imposition of a
criminal punishment under state law. Id. at 701. The court found that any burden imposed
on the defendant by this use of the results was more than justified by the difficulty the prose-
cution has in rebutting psychiatric testimony. Id. at 702. Finally, the court referred to the
need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses as support for imposing a greater burden on the
defense. Id.; see also F. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION 52-65 (1950); Berry, Sef-Incrimination and
the Compulsory Mental Examinatio- A Proposal, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 919, 920 n. 10 (1973).
211 See Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d at 700-01.
212 It is well-documented that the defendant has a tactical advantage if he is examined by
a psychiatrist whose orientation and examination procedures favor his side. See W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, supra note 81, § 40 at 304. Prosecutors, however, can gain the advantage through a
court-ordered examination conducted by a state psychiatrist. Id; see aLso Estelle, 451 U.S. at
465. The report from the court-ordered examination significantly affects the resolution of the
insanity issue; usually the jury believes its results above the testimony of a retained expert. See
Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of the Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MICH. L. REv. 961,
967-68 (1950).
213 For further discussion of the expert witness problem, seesupra text accompanying notes
109-12.
214 672 F.2d at 134.
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (state placed burden on the defendant
to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 P. 98 (1904)
(since sanity is easily feigned and difficult to disprove, it is right in principle to impose the
burden of persuasion for insanity on the defendant).
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alibi, or justify the act itself, as with self-defense. 21 7 These defenses can
exist only at the time of the offense. Thus, disproving an affirmative
defense, regardless of which side bears the ultimate burden of proof, es-
tablishes an essential element of the crime.2  Admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence to rebut one of these defenses would therefore violate
the basic premise of the exclusionary sanction since, in disproving the
defense with illegally obtained evidence, the government would also be
establishing one of the essential elements of the crime with that
evidence.
The insanity defense, however, is broader than the other affirma-
tive defenses. This defense questions whether the defendant was respon-
sible in the first place.219 Moreover, a defendant can be legally insane
and still satisfy the mens rea requirement for the crime charged.220 Use
of illegally obtained evidence solely for rebuttal of insanity would leave
fully intact the government's burden of proof without any reliance on
tainted evidence, thus satisfying the deterrence rationale of the exclu-
sionary rule since "sufficient deterence flows when the evidence in ques-
tion is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief. '221
One court has argued, however, that courts should never admit ille-
gally obtained evidence because it is impossible to know how the jury
will use the evidence. 222 The Fi'nkey court found that since the trial
judge instructed the jury to consider the illegal evidence only as it re-
lated to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, the
accused received sufficient protection against constitutional infringe-
ments.223 In reality, though, the jury is unlikely to be able to obey such
an instruction. 22 4
If, however, courts try the issue of insanity in a separate hearing
217 W. LAFAVE &A. ScoTT, supra note 81, § 8 at 47-48. LaFave and Scott include insanity
among the affirmative defenses that negate a required element of the crime, id. at 47, since
they believe, relying upon In re Wizship, that insanity negates mens rea. Id. at 48. The
Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Patterson v. New York and Rivera v. Delaware, how-
ever, counsel otherwise. See supra note 143.
218 10. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 81, § 8 at 47-48.
219 Note, supra note 34, at 509.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 150-161.
221 Haris, 401 U.S. at 225.
222 See State ex rel. LaFollette v. Raskin, 34 Wisc. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
223 The court's use of the phrase "state of mind" here refers only to whether Finkey was
insane, and should not be confused with the establishment of mens rea. The Fi'kt court
explicitly noted that other evidence properly produced during the tiial "establish[ed] beyond
a reasonable doubt the actus rets portion of the crimes with which Finkey was charged." 105
Ill. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20.
224 Raskin, 34 Wisc. 2d at 625, 150 N.W.2d at 327-28. Yet courts do not seem to have this
problem when statements from compelled psychiatric examinations are used to rebut the
insanity defense. In that situation the jury could easily apply the information from compelled
testimony to the issue of guilt.
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following the determination of guilt, the jury could not misapply the
illegal evidence.225 Under such a bifurcated system, the trier of fact
would completely adjudicate the guilt of the accused without the influ-
ence of the illegally obtained evidence. The physical separation of the
adjudication of guilt and insanity would ensure that the prosecution
does not make affirmative use of illegally obtained evidence in its case in
chief. Thus, no constitutional violations would arise, while the trier of
fact would receive a more complete picture of the defendant's mental
state in accordance with exclusionary jurisprudence.2 2 6
B. THE INSANITY-REBUTTAL EXCEPTION AND THE NEED FOR ALL
RELEVANT EVIDENCE
In rejecting the insanity-rebuttal exception, the Hinckley court to-
tally ignored the benefits to be derived from permitting rebuttal with
illegally obtained evidence.227 The Supreme Court has consistently
stated that the interests protected by exclusion must be weighed against
"the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to
the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which
either party seeks to adduce. '228 This interest is perhaps strongest when
the issue is the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.
Courts have often recognized the extraordinary complexity of the
insanity defense, pointing out that it "intertwin[es] moral, legal, and
medical judgments .... -229 Therefore, the trier of fact should receive
"all possibly relevant evidence bearing on cognition, volition, and ca-
pacity."230 Thus, other courts have found the relevance of the evidence
to a complete determination of the accused's mental state sufficient to
justify admission of illegal evidence.2 31 Moreover, courts have admitted
225 Raskin, 34 Wisc. 2d at 625, 150 N.W.2d at 328.
226 See Supra text accompanying notes 52-78.
227 The Hincklq court thus failed to weigh the benefits against the utility of exclusion,
contrary to current Supreme Court practice in exclusionary rule cases. See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976).
228 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974).
229 King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
230 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
231 See Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480,484 (7th Cir. 1981). InJacks, a tape recording of
the defendant was obtained in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), but the court specifically noted that the
"rationale [ofHanr- and its progeny] has been extended, and properly so, to cases involving
evidence obtained, as here, in violation ofTitle III .. " Id.;see United States v. Caron, 474
F.2d 506, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1973). TheJacks court reasoned that, in addition to its impeach-
ment value, the tape was of "probative effect and of particular relevance" to the defendant's
mental condition, and was thus admissible. 651 F.2d at 484. The Hincklq court dismissed
jacks on two bases: (1) the defendant failed to object at trial to letting the jury consider the
illegally obtained evidence as to his sanity, and (2) federal review in a habeas proceeding was
limited. 672 F.2d at 133 n. 116. It must be noted, however, that in reaching its decision the
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Miranda -violative statements even when a defendant did not testify
where those statements disclosed understanding and awareness relevant
to a determination of insanity.232
Similarly, the Finkey court concluded that the relevance of the
statements to the defendant's insanity defense outweighed the need for
exclusion of the illegal evidence.23 3 As long as the prosecution uses ille-
gal evidence only to present a complete picture of the accused's insanity
defense through rebuttal and not to prove the elements of the crime
charged, the strong societal interest in an accurate determination of the
defendant's sanity outweighs any incremental deterrence that might be
gained from exclusion.2 34
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates the adoption of the insanity-rebuttal ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. In jurisdictions where the parties can
establish proof of sanity after the prosecution has completely established
all essential elements of the crime charged, the prosecution would be
barred from making affirmative use of illegal evidence in its case in
chief, thus accommodating the need to discourage police illegality. This
exception allows the trier of fact to hear highly probative evidence on
insanity while still satisfying the deterrence principles of the exclusion-
ary rule. Moreover, the insanity-rebuttal exception merely extends the
impeachment exception to those cases where a defendant does not take
the stand but does in effect testify through third parties. Finally, the
trier of fact would receive extremely relevant information on the issue of
sanity. Thus, rather than deflecting the truthfinding process, admission
of illegal evidence solely for rebuttal of insanity would further the pro-
Seventh Circuit focused on the admissibility issue, citing these latter bases only as additional
support for its finding of admissibility. Jacks, 651 F.2d at 484-85.
232 United States v. Trujillo, 578 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978).
In Trujillo, the court rejected the claim that testimony concerning a defendant's request for an
attorney, introduced by the government solely to rebut the defendant's insanity defense, un-
constitutionally infringed on the defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent. As in
Fin7k, the defendant in Tjillo did not take the stand. Thus, the illegally obtained testi-
mony could not be used for impeachment purposes. Id. The defendant in Trjillo, convicted
of attempted murder and found insane, illegally purchased a gun. An FBI agent interviewed
the defendant in the hospital the day the gun was found. There the agent gave the defendant
the Miranda warnings and the defendant told the agent he did not read, write or understand
English. A nurse told the agent that the defendant was "articulate in English," and he later
admitted this fact. Id. at 287. At the police station, the defendant was again given Miranda
warnings. He then stated that he would not make any statements until he had consulted with
an attorney, but he gave the agent personal background information. Id. at 287-88. The
agent testified to all of this at trial in relation to the defendant's insanity defense. Id. at 288.
233 105 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 434 N.E.2d at 20.
234 See Powell, 428 U.S. at 489.
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cess without diminishing protection of fourth and fifth amendment
rights.
TERRI M. COULEUR
